Epistemological Approaches to Social Analysis
By Sohail Inayatullah, PhD
Introduction: Since the inception of the Progressive Utilization Theory (PROUT) by P.R. Sarkar in the late 1950s, there have been numerous efforts to come to terms with the various implications and applications, and structures and meanings of this theory. The purpose of this essay is to comment on these commentaries and to surface in the context of PROUTist texts the problem of inquiry. How, for example, does one constitute the real, what categories of thought does one use, and furthermore in what ways is one’s method of inquiry related to or constitutive of the object of inquiry as well as to the discourses (texts, practices, the social construction of what-is) that frame one’s method. Thus, this is a discussion of various epistemological approaches.1
The Applied Approach
There are numerous ways to approach the problem of understanding how one goes about understanding the texts of Sarkar. The first and most obvious approach one is used by Batra, Anderson and others.2 This is the method of taking the categories of PROUT, for example, the PROUT socio-historical category of varna, as given and then applying them to various historical events. What emerges is a revisionist history; a history reinterpreted to fit Sarkar’s cyclical-dialectical view of history and its component categories of worker, warrior, intellectual and acquisitor. For example, in the context of Western history, the Roman Empire now becomes the apex of the Warrior Era, the rise of Christianity becomes the beginning of the Intellectual Era, and the industrial revolution the beginning of the era of the Acquisitors, and the worker-led socialist revolutions of the twentieth century, the beginnings of the next cyclical era of Warriors. This approach is useful in bringing new readings to history and allowing certain structures to emerge that may have been lost by a particular discursive practice, for example, the rationalist-capitalist discourse which privileges a dynastic linear model of history at the expense of structural mythic discourses or the Marxist model of history that privileges economic explanations at the expense of martial, ideological and spiritual interpretations.
The problem with the application-oriented approach is that it does not problematize these categories themselves. How these particular categories came to be important is unattempted, nor is the worldview that these categories privilege inquired into. Thus, the categories themselves are treated as given. One might, for example, ask are these new categories of thought heuristics (typologies that help explain ideas), ideal types (mental often apriori categories), or inductive empirical categories (derived from the natural world).
Moreover, in applying a theory of history to history itself, one intrinsically selects those events and trends, those patterns that fit into one’s preunderstandings. This obviously raises various issues as to the study of history itself; is there one history, or are there alternative histories that are created or repressed, that is, is history dependent on the subject, on interpretation and, if so, how so? Furthermore it can be argued that one’s notion of history is constitutive of one’s theory; that history does not exist independently to one’s linguistic structures. Viewed from this perspective, one’s theory, preunderstandings are complicit in the dominant discourse of the present, thus making any objective history fundamentally problematic. If this is the case, then a serious attempt at uncovering the politics of one’s historical categories, one’s theory of history, is imperative so as to understand how one is structuring history, to understanding what is being epistemologically gained and lost. Without this inquiry, one’s preunderstandings remain unproblematic and thus uncovered within various power configurations.
The Empirical Approach
The second approach, an extension of the applied, is the empirical approach. Here the world is divided into theory and data, with language simply describing the real world, not being constitutive of it. The question then becomes to determine operational, that is, measurable, definitions of Sarkar’s theory. For example, what are the indicators of each social era? How does one know empirically when one is in a particular era? Insofar as Sarkar asserts that those of the intellect and martial psychological wave are reduced to the proletariat, in the era of acquisitors; from the empirical perspective, the question then arises how do we define this category, what are valid indicators for this theoretical construct and how to find reliable and precise data that measure the above? Finally, to prove the hypothesis correct, alternative explanations must be disproved, and the results must be repeated by different studies.
To take another example, Sarkar writes that collectivities are unified either when they have a common enemy (an anti-sentiment) or a universal common vision (an ideology). From the empirical perspective, the project would then be to define collectivities (nations or empires) and then devise valid statistical measurements of unity and separation and finally to operationalize the notion of common enemy and common good into real world measurable indices. The problems with this approach are many. It makes an artificial distinction between what is being talked about and the language one uses to talk about it, forgetting that one’s empirical categories, operationalizations exist in various discursive practices–definitions of what constitutes the real that give significance to one’s results. It thus assumes that there exists an extra-linguistic reality that can be objectively talked about. Also problematic is the assertion that one’s real world indicator is conceptually related to one’s hypothesis, not to mention the problem of gathering reliable data itself, in terms of the categorization, the collection and the reporting of data itself. It also reduces the significance of a theoretical formulation to that of a instrumentalist and rationalist perspective, forgetting the role of the researcher, the interpreter. The empirical approach also does not problematize the theory itself–except in terms of proving or disproving hypotheses–nor does it compare the theory with other theories, except at the level of data analysis. More significantly, the theory as deeper myth (as a story that gives meaning to basic questions as to the nature of what is) is denied; the theory as action (in terms of creating a different world) is denied; as is the theory as vision (as part of a larger project to critique the present, to develop an alternative cosmology) is also denied. However, once we see the empirical perspective as a language, a discourse, then instead of statements that are only meaningful in the context of empiricism, we gain insight into how a theory might be translated (operationalized in the language of the empirical approach), thus, for example, allowing for a discussion on indicators of each particular era without reducing the various hypotheses to mere measurable indicators. Moreover, given that Sarkar redefines development to include the significance of animals and plants, that is, an economics as if all living things mattered, certainly then, for example, in any discussion of indicators of development the impact of economic growth on animal and plant life would no longer be an externality; rather, it would be central to the economic equation.
The Comparative Approach
The third approach is the comparative approach. In this perspective, instead of applying PROUT to history or to the future, or searching for measurable indicators, we treat PROUT as a social movement and compare it with other social movements such as the Green/Environmental movement. We could also treat PROUT as a political philosophy and compare it with other political philosophies such as Liberalism, Conservatism or treat it as a cosmology and compare it with, for example, Islam or Buddhism.
We can structure the comparison along various categories such as ontology, epistemology, polity, economy, nature, technology, center-periphery relationships, and time.
This approach is useful in that a taxonomy of PROUT is developed and we can better understand PROUT as it now stands in the context of other powerful traditions. But there exists a significant problem with this approach. This approach is ahistorical. We are simply comparing one philosophy with another at a particular place in time. In addition, there exists the problem of units of analysis, in that, PROUT is in some ways a cosmology, in other ways a development model, as well as a social movement. Thus, what one compares PROUT with becomes increasingly problematic. Moreover, this approach does not reveal the structure of the categories chosen; for example, the categories one chooses for comparison are also an integral part of a cosmology, of a discourse. The categories economy and polity have only been distinct recently and the separation of the categories nature and technology only are sensible in Occidental models of thought. Thus the categories one chooses are in themselves problematic insofar as they are often part of the structure of a particular discourse, so much so that one may end up with a taxonomy which effectively simply compares not two cosmologies with each other, but the given cosmologies with the silent cosmology that the categories chosen are themselves embedded in–in this case, the epistemology of modernity.
However, significantly, commonalities and differences can be illustrative in leading to understandings of PROUT outside of its own discursive representations and in the case of constituting PROUT as a social movement, useful in attempting to create strategic alliances in the reconstruction project.
The Translational Approach
The fourth approach is the translation approach. Here one takes the language of PROUT, the categories of PROUT themselves and attempts to translate them into an alternative tradition. For example, PROUT speaks of itself in terms of sixteen principles developed and articulated in the form of sutras with accompanying commentaries and constituted in the discursive practices of the Indian philosophical tradition. We can, however, group them in different ways. The categories I have used–borrowed from the Western social science tradition–in various efforts include3: theory of consciousness (ontology, creation-evolution theory, mind-body problems, layers of the mind), development model (concept of progress, theory of value), theory of history (social cycles, dialectics), development ethics (neo-humanism, economics as if all living beings mattered), and strategy (regional, linguistic social movements).
Alternatively, we can also group PROUT into three frames; critique, eschatology, and strategy. Sarkar’s writing implicitly and explicitly critiques the present global system and the values that underlie this system, and at the same time they provide a blueprint and a vision for an alternative vision, a sense of what could be. Finally, Sarkar provides a strategy of how to go from here to there.
The problem with this approach is that any attempt to translate involves not just a problem of syntax, but a problem of discursive practices, that is, a problem of the deeper values and structures embedded in various ways of thinking, or “languaging,” such that a translation may miss not only the entire structure of a perspective but critical categories as well. Thus, in a translation, meanings are regrouped and then re-understood not in the context of the original text but in the context, in the world, of the translation. However, by virtue of it being a translation, there is a useful strategic value in that the information is available to other linguistic communities thus allowing the translated text to become part of the terrain of these communities. In addition, through a hermeneutic theoretical move, one might discover various meanings by comparing the original with the translation.
The empirical approach is similar to this, however, the translation (in the empiricist perspective) is seen as a vertical effort between the theory world of ideas and the real world of data, while the above approach is a horizontal approach between various theoretical constructs.
The Framing Approach
The fifth approach is that of framing Sarkar’s work through the perspective of a variety of disciplines. For example, one may frame it in the language of systems theory. Systems thinking breaks down the whole into a system of interlocking dependent parts, such that the flows of information between sub-systems are noticeable. Changes in a sub-system lead often to changes in the entire system. It is a powerful method to study complexity and interrelatedness. One could then reinterpret various elements of Sarkar’s work as inputs (spiritual inspiration) outputs (social transformation) outcomes (outputs that feedback to inputs, struggle). One can then look at the various relationships between the sub-systems (the spiritual, the organizational, the political) and determine their contribution to the system and the overall goal of the system–in Sarkar’s language, that of spiritual realization and social change. This goal can then be disaggregated into subgoals, that of one nation becoming PROUTist, or social welfare projects completed.
Alternatively, one could frame Sarkar’s PROUT in the language of futures studies. PROUT then becomes an alternative image of the future competing for legitimacy against the dominant vision of the future, modernity, and along with other images, the socialist democratic vision, the environmental vision, the Islamic vision, or the global socialist vision. PROUT, then, is reconstituted as an alternative possible future. Of course, from the perspective of a PROUTist worker, PROUT is not an alternative vision, it is perhaps the vision of the future, or at least, the most probable vision of what is to be. Moreover, from the perspective of the futures field, PROUT is defined as a forecasting methodology, as a way of predicting the society of tomorrow.
While this approach is quite useful, the failings are obvious. Any discipline one might use has its own biases; each discipline privileges a certain discourse. For example, systems theory simply organizes in a rationalist and functionalist fashion the components of the system, it does not allow for alternative designs or interpretations, for example, those possible through a dialectical framework, or a mythic symbolic one. Moreover, systems theory is a metaphor that makes certain assumptions as to what is considered the natural state of things (the notion that every system naturally move to a state of equilibrium, for example). As a metaphor it exaggerates and hides; certain meanings are accentuated, others are silenced.
The futures approach, too, is problematic. For one it is ahistorical. Secondly, critical is the problem of constituting the future in two seemingly discrete categories: preferred and probable. The probable future is determined by a variety of forecasting technologies such as dialectics, statistics, cycles of history, or expert opinion and is phrased apolitically, that is, the role of subjectivity, in terms of which forecasting methodology is chosen, or the role of epistemology, one’s theory of knowledge, is seen as given. However, once we politicize the category of probable future and argue that is it is often a result of problem selection, or methodology selection, or moreover, one’s discursive practices (one’s ideology, at a simple level), then the problematic nature of the distinction between probable and preferred becomes apparent. Even when the most probable solution is seen as a dystopia, this creation functions as a warning system, a way of articulating what might happen if one’s preferred future does not result, or if the present continues, then as an objectively gotten probable future.
Finally, by focusing on PROUT as a predictive social theory, in so far as Sarkar contends that the social cycle is a law of nature in much the same way as numerous writers have located Marxist theory, then the legitimacy of the entirety of the theory falls or rises based on its social forecasting utility; its interpretative value, its critical value, its value as praxis are denied.
However, the futures approach provides new meanings and allows different discourses to speak, thus potentially shedding light on that which is to be interpreted. Moreover, by framing it in the category of thought of “alternative future” it is somewhat legitimized as an actual possibility of a future society, rather then fiction. Thus, its theoretical framework and its policy prescriptions are seen as potentially relevant in the various academic, governmental, and international development dialogs.
The Phenomenological Approach
The sixth approach is to look at the way Sarkar, himself, constitutes his world. We begin here with the phenomenological perspective; we are concerned with gaining insight into the text on the terms of the text. Instead of seeking to test the text or translate the text, or to refit the text to a “prepackaged” methodology, we examine how PROUT sees itself. What categories and structures does Sarkar use? For example, Sarkar develops a six point theory of successful societal development–spiritual ideology, spiritual practice, preceptor, spiritual texts, socio-economic theory, and social outlook. With these categories, we can locate PROUT as well as other systems or movements. Also illustrative is Sarkar’s typology of the failure of theories. For him, the first category is that of hypocrite’s theory, or those developed to serve the interest of a particular class or interest, that is “to dupe the people,”4 The second is the range of theories that exist without any basis in the real, with the day to day suffering of the physical world or the possibilities of the spiritual world, that is, they speak solely in the world of mentalities.
The third is the range of theories that result from a particular culture or environment, but are however universalized and thus fail because of their generalization. For Sarkar, the Marxist effort can be thus categorized.
The fourth are those constructs that fail to develop because of implementation problems: political, bureaucratic or individual.
This approach is highly useful in that we see how PROUT creates itself, we see its structure in its terms, we see how PROUT sees the world and we learn from it about the way we construct our world. Thus, instead of interpreting PROUT, we now engage in the process of rethinking our own selves, our own world. We uncover ourselves. This process reduces the distances between author, text, and audience and a multi-layered dialog is created. However, this approach does not problematize PROUT itself. It does not allow for comparison between different cosmologies, that is, while this model obviously critiques communism for being weak on spiritual practice, we do not find out how communism locates PROUT in its hierarchy of successful movements or theories. In addition, it is ahistorical in that we do not see the historical context of the various constructs of PROUT.
The challenge then becomes to see Prout categories of the world as not goals of an ideal society but in fact as lenses to constitute the world. Thus instead of using current categories of polity and economy to understand Prout, the task is to use Sarkar’s categories of neo-humanism and varna, for example, to make sense of what the world is and can be. Prout then becomes not just a vision of an ideal society but an analytic tool in which to dissect the current world. This means instead of acceding to traditional political analysis and thus borrowing neo-realistic (conventional political science analysis) liberal frames which privilege the nation-state, the task is to use Prout categories such as varna, prama, neo-humanism and the layers of the mind to better understand, and thus create a world with enhanced fidelity to Prout theory.
The Postmodern/Poststucturalist Approach
The seventh approach is that of the postmodern/poststructuralist. Here we examine the various structures within Sarkar’s cosmology; that is, the linguistic discourses, the way that it is constructed, the monuments of language and power in front of us. From this perspective, the goal is to examine the text of Sarkar and see what discourses or linguistic worldviews he is privileging; what epistemologies and discourses he is seeking to encourage, and what ways of thinking as constituted in various discourses he is attempting to make problematic, to critique. Thus, instead of dialog, we are seeking to distance ourselves from a typical, that is, mundane, discussion on the varieties of what Sarkar really means in a certain text.
With this perspective, we gain insight into the structure of Sarkar’s writing. For example, Sarkar is clearly attempting to make the present less concrete by developing a dialectical-cyclical theory of history. In addition, he is politicizing the future by not positing an end to politics, that is, a state when all class struggle is over, yet he embraces structure by arguing that there does exist a cyclical law of social change. Sarkar is also privileging the spiritual location and creation of identities and structures by positing that the end all of existence is spiritual realization.
The critical question in this perspective is not what is real, as with the comparative approach, but how is it real? How is Sarkar’s cosmology constituted? What are the values embedded in it? Given that language structures are complicit with the domains of power, we are then not surprised that Sarkar’s work is largely critical of the present and critical of the way we normally constitute our histories of the present. For him, history is the history of elites. The stories of the courage of the suppressed have been silenced, the victories that are told are those of the already powerful: the wealthy, the royal, and the keepers of the word, the various priests of knowledge.
He is thus critical of the reality of poverty and the poverty of our theories of reality. We can thus better understand how, Sarkar, for example, attempts to relocate the self away from our common understandings, that is, the self as related to status, income, body to a self located in spiritual consciousness eternally distanced from ego, time and space and at the same time a self located in all other selves, thus allowing for a discourse that enables compassion and activism.
For Sarkar, then, the reconstitution of spirituality becomes a defense against modernity and a purposeful effort to unite in the world with all other living beings, and thus as an effort to transform the withdrawn self of antiquity and the segmented self of modernity.
The examples above are only illustrative of the type of inquiry that one enters within the post-structuralist approach. This is not to say that we should abandon the other approaches. They too are important in gaining understandings of PROUT.
However, this approach is more enabling in that we better understand the social construction of PROUT and then create an epistemological space that results in richer interpretations of PROUT. For example, simply testing PROUT’s theory of history on various civilizations in the pursuit of an objective history forgets that one has a pre-understanding, and that this understanding is part of a politics–that objectivity is problematic, with subjectivity complicit in present domains of power.
Moreover, the post-structuralist approach is complimentary with other approaches such as the futures or the comparative by providing a larger structure for critical inquiry. For example, if we were to describe the culture, the political-economy or the historical place of a particular collectivity like the Philippines, we can create different levels of responses. The first is to revise Filipino history in terms of Sarkar’s eras, to see how the present has come to be within the language of PROUT; and at a different level of analysis, we can deconstruct this revision, that is, the notion of cycles, and we can discover how such a discursive practice results in various commitments to history, to the present, and to notions of a good society. In much the same way, the question how do the writings of Sarkar compare with the writings of great Islamic scholars, for example, Iqbal, can lead to various types of analysis. One can compare how they see themselves, how their writings deal with the problem of the present dominant system of modernity, that is, at their effort to develop counter hegemonic discourses and, at another level, we can see how they are constituted by present discourses, and how they have come to be. Thus, the various approaches are not exclusive.
The strength of the postmodern/poststructuralist inquiry is in focusing on how power is constituted in the real. Knowledge is thus seen not as neutrally derived but as central to the political negotiation of reality. Sarkar, of course, already attempts this when he argues that the type of knowledge interests one has are largely dependent on the larger power relations, on the particular cycle in history one might be in.
In terms of PROUT writers, Charles Paprocki5 has attempted this type of analysis when he argues that epistemology is related to the type of society one is in, capitalist or socialist, for example. Of course, these efforts have remained inarticulate to the significance of language structures in concealing power relations. Moreover, the post-modern approach has not been used to understand the texts of Sarkar itself, that is to deconstruct PROUT as well.
However, as with all approaches, this perspective too is problematic when taken alone. Continuous undoing of categories can lead to a paralysis of research and action, where no inquiry does not move forward because all is suspect, or because a worldview of postmodern nihilism takes over, wherein reality is seen as so malleable that the idea of a good society, of reducing oppression, cease to be possible.
Beyond Discourse
As important as asking what is after discourse, is – given the above privileging of discourse, of the argument that the world is created through language, and that in this imposition, power remains hidden and elusive – the prediscursive, the realm outside of language. Here we stand in a hermeneutic and phenomenological stance in that we are interpreting Sarkar’s work, attempting to engage in a dialog between PROUT and post-structuralism. For Sarkar, discursive analysis privileges the intellect, and reduces the spiritual, the transcendental to the relative, to a mere discourse. Sarkar, himself, argues for a spiritual knowledge interest; one that delegitimizes rationalistic qua modernity modes of knowing as well as intellectual qua mental ways of knowing. Sarkar would thus agree that the discursive approach is a critically important perspective and that language does create the world. This is why he and other mystics such as those of the Zen Buddhist tradition emphasize ways of knowing other than the intellect. For Sarkar, therefore, the post-structuralist effort is an activity contained within the arena of mind, the task then becomes to transcend mind through activities such as meditation, or through koans. Here the practitioner is forced out of mind; the self then no longer is constituted in ego, but in itself, in unmediated, inexpressible consciousness. The subject-object duality does not exist, rather there is a state of the unity of consciousness. In his words:
That which comes within the orbit of mind is but a relative truth, not an eternal truth and so it will come and go. Scriptures (texts) and mythologies are but stacks of bricks, they are only arranged in layers, carrying no significance or intrinsic value. So how can they describe the Transcendental Entity which is beyond the scope of the mental faculty. How then can this intuitional perspective be interpreted, which is beyond the compass of body, words and mind? Here both the teacher and disciple are helpless, because the subject, which is beyond the domain of any academic discourse and discussion, is simply inexplicable and inexpressible. Whatever said and discussed comes within the ambit of the mind and so it is a relative truth–true today and false tomorrow. That is why, the teacher becomes mute when he is asked to explain transcendental knowledge (the Buddha remained silent when asked if the Transcendental entity existed and equally silent when asked if it did not exist) and consequently the disciple, too, becomes deaf. So … in order to explain this profound mystery, there is no other alternative than to emulate the symbolic exchange of views between a deaf and a dumb person.
6 The transcendental, then, is the realm of the prediscursive, a space that cannot be talked of, or listened too, for such an effort would evoke the discourses of the present, past, and future, that is, the discourses that transpire because of mind.
The counter response from the post-structuralist position is that the distinction being made is an ontological one, in terms of what is real. Discursive analysis constitutes itself by asking how has a particular practice become real, how has the view of a transcendental self emerged and what are its commitments. Thus, the purpose is not to engage in an ontological debate as to the nature of ultimate truth, but to seek to uncover the politics of ontology. By constituting the real as a discourse, we gain distance from past and present and future and thus see the real as human creation and thus contentious, that is, available for negotiation. It is because of the recognition of the primacy of discourse, and the effort to avoid this location, that both teacher and student remain in silence and thereby in a non-discursive space.
However, as to the nature of Being, the responses of course would vary. Different writers might argue that intrinsically, what is, is from the first to the last, within and without, meaningless, and thus all knowing efforts are projects of imposition, of the knower. The prediscursive is not the realm of the spiritual, but the realm of other possible discourses, ways of constructing what is. Alternatively, one might argue that one simply cannot know the ontological status of what is.
From Sarkar’s view, too, ultimately one can say nothing about the ultimate nature of being, except that any effort to say anything would be embedded in mind, in language and structure (time, place and subject), in relativity. The problem of the relationship between the absolute and the relative then becomes the key and unresolvable, by mind, issue. For once we define this nature (of Being), then, we, for the post-structuralist, simply create new categories, hierarchies, that is, models of existence, or what is commonly called philosophy. This is unavoidable since after the silence and the muteness, we (the teacher and student) still must return to discourse and recreate the world once again. We enter a discursive space; a space embedded in meaning, in language, in historical identity.
The task for Sarkar then becomes of privileging a spiritual discourse as for him one’s theoretical formulations become better in that they are created from a non-discursive space that is intuitional; intellect is placed within a larger epistemological framework. For Sarkar the nature of Being itself cannot be answered, since “the tongue cannot taste itself.” However, through action commitments, spiritual practices, more of the real can be accessible to the spiritual aspirant.
Upon expression then the discourse of the present, past, and future, of power then emerges, for in agreement with the post-structuralist, Sarkar asserts that once one speaks then one immediately constitutes oneself in mind, and thus in a particular power structure, in a discursive practice. For the post-structuralist committed to inquiry and analysis, certainly, the how of that constitution then becomes the critical and interesting question.
What this means for PROUTist inquiry is that even as PROUT makes truth-claims about the nature of the ideal social and political system, these claims must be bracketed in the knowledge episteme in which they were uttered. They should be understood and applied in their various contexts. This does not mean they are not “true” but rather that a complex mode of analysis must be used to understand PROUT and to articulate PROUT policy. Sarkar hints at this when he asserts that the real is time, place and person dependent.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have tried to show that there are different approaches to understanding a particular subject, a text, and that this effort of understanding is problematic. When we treat texts as unproblematic we affirm various discourses and our efforts remain bounded by these particular discourses at the expense of other discourses. Through attempts at inquiry, we can hopefully better see the problematic nature of our knowing efforts and thus engage in more enabling understandings of understanding.
The seven modes of inquiry articulated: applied, empirical, comparative, translation, framing, phenomenological and postmodern/poststructural, must be seen within a complex framework. It is thus important to note the context of one’s research, one’s epistemological biases, and be able to move in and out of various research perspectives, allowing each to inform the other, not becoming caught in hegemonic knowledge frame, remaining like PROUT itself comprehensive and complex.
Notes
1. A version of this essay appears in Sohail Inayatullah, Situating Sarkar. Brisbane and Ananda Nagar, Gurukul Press, 1999. This essay is inspired by a series of conversations with Michael Shapiro as well as from a reading of his various works. See, for example, Political Language and Understanding, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981 and The Politics of Representation. Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
2. See Ravi Batra, The Downfall of Capitalism and Communism. London, Macmillan Press, 1978 and Tim Anderson, The Liberation of Class. Calcutta, Proutist Universal Publications, 1985.
3. See Sohail Inayatullah, “The Futures of Cultures: Present Images, Past Visions, and Future Hopes,” in Eleonora Masini, James Dator, and Sharon Rodgers, eds. The Futures of Development. Beijing, China, UNESCO, 1991 and “PROUT in the Context of Alternative Futures,” Cosmic Society (October, 1988).
4. P. R. Sarkar, A Few Problems Solved Vol. 6. Trans. Acarya Vijayananda Avadhuta and Acarya Anandamitra Avadhutika. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1988, 17.
5. See Charles Paprocki, “On PROUTist Methodology,” (unpublished paper, 1981).
6. P. R. Sarkar, Subhasita Samgraha. Anandanagar, Ananda Marga Publications, 1975, 114-115.
Copyright The author 2012